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Abstract 
This paper investigates how regulation impinges on the launch strategies of international 
pharmaceutical corporations for new molecules and generics across the main OECD markets 
during 1960-2008. Comprehensive IMS data is used to analyze the international diffusion of 845 
molecules from 14 different anatomic therapeutic categories using non-parametric survival 
analysis. The paper focuses on two main regulatory changes that reshaped the barriers to entry 
substantially:  the US Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 and the establishment of the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) in 1995. We find that legal transaction costs have a significant impact 
on timing of launch. Stringent market authorization requirements for new pharmaceutical 
products in the US after 1962 resulted in a significant US drug lag in the introduction of 
pharmaceutical innovation vis-à-vis Europe during 1960-1984. However, financial incentives of 
the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act proved effective in closing this lag. A more streamlined EMA 
regulatory approval process has reduced barriers to entry in Europe enabling quicker diffusion of 
pharmaceutical products, yet a marked pattern of delay in adoption of innovation is still evident 
due to local differences in pricing regulations. New molecule launch strategically takes place 
first in higher-priced EU markets as a result of threat of arbitrage and price dependency across 
the member states. Finally, the impact of price controls on the launch timing of pharmaceutical 
innovation translates to the adoption of imitative pharmaceutical products-hampering access not 
only to new technologies but also to cost-saving substitute products. 
 
Key words: international drug launch, drug lag, pharmaceutical regulation.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the regulatory environment impinges on the 
launch strategies of pharmaceutical corporations across the main OECD markets during 1960-
2008. How regulation affects adoption of innovation is a question open to empirical scrutiny, 
especially in highly regulated industries such as the pharmaceutical industry where products and 
processes are protected by intellectual property rights. Although several studies have been 
carried out, the existing evidence in the pharmaceutical context is limited. Particularly important 
is the role of the timing of new drug launch, which is typically carried out by international 
companies following some corporate strategy. Paradoxically, the impact of regulation on generic 
products within a therapeutic group has received even less attention. Expected proliferation of 
bioequivalent products in the near future, rising concerns over cost containment and the resulting 
push for genericization makes timing of generic launch a question of interest both for the 
pharmaceutical industry and the policy makers.  
 
Normally, firms facing a competitive environment would like to launch new chemical entities 
(NCE) as quickly as possible into several markets while the product is still under patent 
protection to amortize the substantial R&D outlays. However, there are at least two regulatory 
hurdles that firms have to overcome before commercializing a new drug product. The first hurdle 
is that manufacturers have to prove the threefold requirement of quality, safety and efficacy of 
new molecules which is estimated to take around ten years of pre-clinical and clinical research 
(Permanand 2006). The second hurdle typically includes the review of the new product dossier 
by the regulatory authority (FDA1, EMA2 or any national authority) and approval of marketing 
authorization (MA). Finally, the third hurdle following marketing approval is pricing and 
reimbursement (P&R) which involves negotiations between manufacturers and P&R authorities 
regarding the price of the new product and its reimbursement status. Price regulation can 
arguably  delay launch through the negotiation processes alongside the resulting firm strategies 
of delaying or foregoing launch in low-priced markets3 (Danzon, Wang et al. 2005; Kyle 2007). 
Non-homogeneity in these hurdles across markets results in launch delays, with welfare 
implications for the consumer and the pharmaceutical producer.  
 
Lags in adoption of new pharmaceutical innovations may affect consumer welfare through 
impaired access to new drug products, in particular cost-effective products. Empirical evidence 
shows that lack of access to new drugs leads to compromises in health outcomes (Schoffski 
2002), shifts volume to older molecules of lower therapeutic value (Danzon and Ketcham 2004) 
                                                 
1 Food and Drug Administration 
2 European Medicines Agency (www.ema.europa.eu) 
3 The US, UK and Germany do not require price approval; however, in the UK, Germany and several other markets 
cost-effectiveness evaluation may further delay the adoption of new pharmaceutical innovation as the fourth hurdle 
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and results in higher expenditures on other forms of medical care and  compromises in quality of 
health care (Kessler 2004; Wertheimer and Santella 2004). Innovative medications offer 
economic benefits through fewer work days missed and lives saved (Lichtenberg 1996; 
Lichtenberg 2003; Hassett 2004; Lichtenberg 2005). Delays in the launch of new molecules 
could be costly to the pharmaceutical industry through reduced market exclusivity periods, lower 
returns to R&D and eventually fewer innovations4.  
 
Generic products are by definition bioequivalent, and therefore perfect substitutes (on objective 
quality grounds), to their branded counterparts that usually claim substantial price mark-ups over 
the marginal cost of production5. Generic entry following patent expiry is argued to enhance 
efficiency and competition in the drug market; however, the main hurdle before generic entry is 
the cost of bioequivalence tests which have been estimated to be significantly cheaper than the 
average costs of safety and clinical evaluation6. Generic imitations largely free-ride on the R&D 
efforts of originator firms, which enables them to compete solely based on price. Timely 
adoption of generic products, therefore, carries significant importance to improve allocative 
efficiency and stimulate competition (DG Competition 2009).  
 
The analysis in this paper draws upon an extensive database on the timing and entry of new 
pharmaceutical molecules along with the entry of bioequivalent competitors. The paper has 
several contributions to the literature on regulation and changes in corporate behaviour. First, 
data used in previous studies is mainly restricted to specific, small time periods. Second, one of 
the most important dimensions of market dynamics, the timing dimension of new and old 
products, has been traditionally left out of the analysis of drugs. Finally, the paper assesses 
corporate behaviour with respect to two main regulatory changes that reshaped the barriers to 
entry substantially:  1) the US Hatch-Waxman Act in 19847; 2) the establishment of the 
European Medicines Agency (EMA) in 1995 along with the adoption of the centralized 
procedure that grants a Community marketing authorization.  
 
The organisation of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the data and methods used in the 
analysis; Section 3 discusses the results of the analysis along with corresponding regulatory 
triggers; and finally Section 4 concludes. 
                                                 
4 Both profit expectations and lagged cash flows have been shown to have significantly positive impacts on 
pharmaceutical firms’ R&D investment intensity (Vernon 2005) 
5 A generic is defined by the European Directive 2004/27/EC as “a medicinal product which has the same qualitative 
and quantitative composition in active substances and the same pharmaceutical form as the reference medicinal 
product, and whose bioequivalence with the reference medicinal product has been demonstrated by appropriate 
bioavailability studies.” 
6 18 times cheaper according to the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association 1993) 
7 The cut off value of 1984 has been suggested as a pivotal year in the history of drug introduction patterns between 
the US and the UK (Coppinger, Peck et al. 1989) 
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2. DATA AND METHODS 
2.1 Data 
 
The IMS data used in the analysis contains quarterly sales in dollars and standard units for 
molecules from 14 different ATC groups and 20 countries8 9. Additional data fields include 
global and local launch date of drug products, pharmaceutical form, anatomic therapeutic class 
of the product, the distribution channel of sales (hospital vs. retail), and patent protection status 
of the drug. The markets in the dataset comprise the majority of the global pharmaceutical sales 
and are all based in the OECD except for South Africa. Results are reported for the main seven 
pharmaceutical markets comprised of the US, Japan and the EU5 (namely the UK, Germany, 
France, Italy, and Spain).  
 
Multi-country drug lag studies apply several criteria to identify significant NCEs. Some consider 
molecules that have launched in the US and/or the UK as an indication of therapeutic 
significance and potential for global launch (Parker 1984; Danzon, Wang et al. 2005). Several 
studies find a direct relationship between the therapeutic contribution of a new drug and its 
likelihood of achieving widespread introduction (Parker 1984; Barral 1985). This finding 
suggests that most one-market new chemical entities (NCEs) do not simply disperse among 
countries more slowly than others, but that they are never going to be widely available due to 
their marginal therapeutic advantages. Molecules that have not launched in the US and the UK 
are excluded to avoid any potential bias due to one-market molecules and to ensure that 
molecules with potential global importance are considered. Hereafter, this potentially global set 
of molecules is referred as US&UK molecules.  
 
In addition, a global molecule set comprised of molecules that have diffused to all twenty 
markets on the database is defined. These two sets provide a means to compare relative drug lags 
for molecules with different levels of international spread and to assess whether there exists a 
systematic difference between the two.  For brevity, the results for US&UK molecules only are 
reported. Findings for global molecules are broadly in line with the estimates for US&UK 
molecules.  
 
Table 1 presents the breakdown of molecules by the period of global launch. The majority of the 
molecules had their global launch during 1960-1984. In total 845 molecules were launched in the 
US and UK since 1960, 200 of which diffused to all markets. Only 350 of the molecules had a 
                                                 
8 IMS (Intercontinental Medical Services) MIDAS data was collected at Merck Sharp and Dome Limited (MSD) 
premises in Hoddesdon, UK. 
9 Australia (ALIA), Austria (AUS), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), 
Greece (GRE), Italy (ITA), Japan (JAP), Netherlands (NET), Poland (POL), Portugal (POR), South Africa (SAF), 
Spain (SPA), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (SWI), Turkey (TUR), the UK, and the US 
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generic launch both in the US and UK. The US, UK, Germany, France, Canada and Switzerland 
are among countries that had the greatest number of launches whereas Portugal, Japan, Spain, 
Belgium, Sweden and Turkey had the least number of launches. The highest number of generic 
molecule launches occurred in the US, UK, Germany, Canada, Poland, Australia and 
Netherlands. 
 
Table 1 Number of Molecules by Period of Global Launch 
  US&UK 
(All) 
US&UK 
(Generic) 
[60-84) 385 214 
[84-95] 194 90 
[95-08] 266 46 
TOTAL 845 350 
 
2.2 Methods 
Launch times are the most important information to feed a non-parametric survival analysis. The 
advantage of nonparametric approaches lies in that it provides a good fit for any distribution 
without any prior assumptions about the functional form of the failure time. The analysis takes 
place at the molecule level, whereby subjects are defined as potential molecule-country launches. 
The failure event is interpreted as the launch of a given molecule in the destination market. The 
failure indicator is set to one if the molecule launches in the given market and to zero if the 
molecule is censored (i.e. does not launch by the end of the observation period 2008)10.  
The time to failure event is defined as the time lapse from the first global launch date of the 
molecule (the onset of risk) to the date of launch in a particular country (the failure).  The global 
launch date is the first date the molecule launched in any country in the IMS database. Since 
drug products may differ with respect to the local launching corporation, dosage, and form, the 
local launch date of each molecule is defined as the minimum launch date among drug products 
of the same molecule in individual countries. Missing global launch dates are proxied by the 
minimum local launch date across all twenty markets. Relative launch lags are defined as the 
difference between the global launch date and the country-specific local launch date11.  
Differential timing of launch could be due to variations in market authorization dates or delays in 
pricing and reimbursement procedures as well as strategic firm delays to avoid threats of price 
spillovers across markets (Danzon, Wang et al. 2005). The global launch date is used to define 
                                                 
10 For global molecules right-censoring is not an issue since the exact launch time of every molecule is known in all 
countries. 
11 Spain, Turkey, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Spain, South Africa have only retail channel data; therefore, the first 
local launches in these countries represents launch in the retail sector. 
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the onset of risk for molecule launches due to unavailability of data to isolate the delays due to 
these components.  
The risk onset in the case of pharmaceutical imitation is defined as the date when the first 
generic product of a given molecule launched in any of the twenty markets. It would have been 
informative to carry out the analysis by considering generic delays following the local protection 
expiry dates. This approach was not followed because expiry date is available only in 3% of the 
data and in 56% of these cases expiry date exceeds local launch by more than a year, which 
could be due to the presence of copy products in some markets, launch of pseudogenerics12 (also 
known as authorized generics) or errors in reporting the expiry dates.  
 
2.2.1 Non-parametric Kaplan-Meier Estimates 
The survivor function estimate , the probability that the subject fails beyond time t, is 
estimated by (Kaplan and Meier 1958):  
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Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor function S(t) at time t are obtained using Stata 10.  The 
median survival time corresponds to the smallest time point at which the survivor function is less 
than or equal to 0.5 ( = 0.5), i.e. the time point at which half of the molecule candidates have 
launched. Mean survival time, on the other hand, is estimated as the area under the survival 
curve. Due to the significant right-skewed nature of failure time distributions inferences are 
ˆ
                                                
( )S t
 
12 Pseudogenerics are generics marketed by brand-name companies to compete against independent generics 
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based primarily on the median delays. The median survival times are estimated in each market 
for molecules by period of entry into the risk set, i.e. first global launch during 1960-1984, 1984-
1995 and 1995-2008. This framework allows the comparison of the evolution of relative launch 
lags both across countries and over time. Since the cut-off points of 1984 and 1995 correspond to 
two major regulatory changes in the US and Europe, their impact on timing of launch can be 
assessed comparatively using medians before and after these cut-off values.  
 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Trends in the Adoption of Pharmaceutical Innovation  
Evolution of Median Delays over Decades 
Figure 1 shows the trend in overall median delays for US&UK molecules across the twenty 
markets from 1960 to 2008. A marked acceleration in the international diffusion speed of 
pharmaceuticals is observed. While the overall median is 11 years for molecules with a global 
launch in 1960-1985, the median drops to 4 and 2 years for molecules that launched in 1984-
1995 and 1995-2008 respectively (see Table A.1 in the Appendix for the medians in individual 
countries over time). The significance of this trend is tested by a Cox proportional hazard model 
that controls for the period of global launch. Coefficients are estimated both by a Cox model 
with country fixed effects and a random effects Cox model with shared frailties for the same 
country launches. Both the fixed effects and the random effects indicate that hazard of launch13 
is significantly higher for molecules that first launched during 1995-2008 compared to 1984-
1995. Similarly, the hazard is higher for molecules that launched in 1984-1995 compared to 
1960-1984. The Hausman test that compares the fixed and random effects specifications 
indicates that the fixed effects model is the correct specification (p-value: 0.0135). Based on the 
fixed effects specification launch in 1960-1984 decreases the hazard by 48% and launch in 1995-
2008 increases the hazard by 82%, both compared to launch in 1984-1995.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 The instantaneous probability of launch conditional on not launching before 
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Figure 1. Overall median delays with respect to period of global launch 
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The acceleration of the international diffusion of pharmaceutical products may be attributed to 
the evolution in barriers to entry as a result of changes in the regulatory environment and an 
increasingly global and interdependent market environment. The increasing international reach 
of pharmaceutical corporations as evidenced by the spread of the manufacturing, marketing and 
innovative R&D activities to different countries has overcome prior geographical barriers. 
Harmonization of safety and efficacy and marketing authorization requirements across markets 
has contributed to a reduction in regulatory costs (Busfield 2003). The following sections present 
the survival estimates for individual markets in the biggest seven pharmaceutical markets and 
describe in more detail the regulatory changes that may explain the evolutionary trend in the 
lags.  
 
3.1.1 1960-1984: Stringency in MA Regulations and the US drug lag 
The Thalidomide tragedy in the late 1950s, which caused congenital anomalies in babies and a 
degenerative nerve disorder in pregnant women, marked the beginning of a new era in modern 
medicine regulation. Until the early 1960s most countries except the Nordic countries and the US 
had no independent safety and efficacy protocols for new drugs. The US had a regulatory office 
for pharmaceuticals, the FDA, which was empowered to license medicines subject to certain 
safety standards. US drug companies had to show only the safety of their new products before 
1960. However, in1962 the US Kefauver Harris Amendments introduced an additional proof-of-
efficacy requirement as a response to the Thalidomide disaster. Other countries in Europe 
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aligned their marketing authorizing procedures for increased safety and efficacy only in late 
1960s and early 1970s (Permanand 2006).  
 
The debate about launch delays extends back to 1960s when the main concern was the 
significant US drug lag compared to the main EU markets, mainly as a result of the more 
stringent US regulations. Wardell, a pharmacologist, coined the term “drug lag” and increased 
awareness of the unavailability of new drugs in the US, and stressed that the delay affected 
therapeutically important drugs as well (Wardell 1973; Wardell 1974; Wardell 1978). Later 
studies by Grabowski (1980), Berlin and Jonsson (1986) and Kaitin (1989) confirmed findings of 
Wardell (Grabowski 1980; Berlin and Jonsson 1986; Kaitin, Mattison et al. 1989).  
 
The survival estimates in this study for molecules that launched first during 1960-1984 confirm 
findings of the early literature that the US market was relatively disadvantaged for the timely 
adoption of pharmaceutical innovations as a result of much stricter requirements for regulatory 
approval. The survival graph in Figure 2 shows the probability that molecule launch in a given 
country occurs after t years following global launch, conditional on the fact that the molecule has 
not launched in that country up to time t. Hence, it takes longer for countries with a higher 
survival curve to adopt new pharmaceutical innovations. The median survival time, the time 
point at which half of the molecule candidates have launched, is given by the t value where the 
survival probability is 0.5.  
 
Figure 2. Survival Estimates: 1960-1984  
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During 1960-1984, Europe is found to be leading in the introduction of pharmaceutical 
innovation. As expected, free price countries such as the UK and Germany are leading markets, 
with a median delay of 3 years and are followed by Italy, France and Spain with a corresponding 
lag of 3.5− 4 years. The US lags behind the slowest European market by about half a year. Japan 
has the most dramatic delay of 12 years, which can be attributed to geographical barriers and 
predominantly domestic nature of the market, especially in a period when the global expansion 
of pharmaceutical corporations was relatively limited.  
 
3.1.2 1984-1995: The US Hatch-Waxman Act and Stimulus for Innovation 
The Hatch Waxman Act, also known as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act of 1984, was enacted to compensate for the loss in effective patent life during drug 
development. The Act extended pharmaceutical patents for the time lost in clinical testing and 
regulatory review, but the entire patent term restored was restricted to 5 years and the term of the 
restored patent following FDA approval was restricted to 14 years. In addition, the Act 
introduced a five-year market exclusivity period for NMEs such that once an NME is approved a 
generic manufacturer cannot submit an application until 5 years after the approval of the pioneer 
and thus cannot enter the market for at least 5 years. These amendments enabled pharmaceutical 
innovators to recoup some of the revenue losses due to regulatory stringency after 1962. The 
main aim of the Act, however, was to maintain incentives for innovation while ensuring quick 
generic entry.  Although the impact on the brand-name drugs is somewhat contentious, data  
from the literature suggests that stimulation for innovation resulted in increased R&D funding 
and R&D intensity (Branes 2007). 
Figure 3. Survival Estimates: 1984 - 1995 
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Survival estimates in this study indicate a stark improvement in the US for the timing of new 
product launches vis-à-vis Europe (Figure 3). The median delay in the US decreased from about 
8 years to 3 years following the enactment of the Act whereas the corresponding decrease in the 
leading markets of UK and Germany was on the order of one year only. While the US was the 
second slowest market to adopt new pharmaceutical molecules in 1960-1984, after the 1984 Act 
the US becomes one of the leading markets along with the UK and Germany. The estimates 
present a clear indication that the 1984 Act has generated a more favourable environment for 
market entry in the US and suggests an increase in overall R&D activity in the US 
pharmaceutical industry. 
  
The remaining markets in Europe also experience faster introductions after 1984. In particular, 
the medians in France and Italy decrease by 3 years (to about 3.5 years). The one-year reduction 
in the Spanish median delay is more modest and can be partially attributed to the lack of product 
patent protection for new pharmaceuticals before ratification of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995. 
Overall, Spain and Japan emerge as the slowest adopters following the 1984 Act. Local clinical 
trial requirements are the core factor for the Japanese drug lag and the exclusion of foreign 
corporations from the Japanese market. According to a study that analyzes the Japanese lag 
during 1981-1993, the second influential factor is the price regulations since 1981 that sharply 
lowered launch prices and the life cycle sales of drugs launched into Japan (Thomas 2001). 
 
Patent term restoration in Europe was enacted only eight years following the 1984 Act in the US. 
In 1992, Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) extended the protection period of 
pharmaceutical products in the European Community (EC) by 5 years following patent-expiry or 
15 years of protection from the date of first market authorization in the EC, instead of twenty 
years after patent application as under the European Patent Convention14. This prolonged the 
profit life of products as drug sales are generally highest during the period of market exclusivity. 
In addition, the SPC prevented generic companies from engaging in R&D prior to patent expiry, 
which essentially ensured a longer shelf-life for branded products and provided stimulus for 
innovation. The relative delay in providing financial stimulus for innovation through patent term 
restoration in the EU could be an additional factor that explains the drastic improvement in the 
timing of new product launches in the US vis-à-vis Europe during 1984-1995.  
 
 
3.1.3 1995-2008: EMA and Harmonization across the Globe 
The set up of a single market in 1993 and a common currency in 1999 (when exchange rates 
were pegged) ensured free movement of people, goods and services within the EU. Since then 
                                                 
14 The SPC became effective on Jan 1993 and applied to drugs granted market authorization in the EU after Jan 
1985. 
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market authorization has been streamlined by the establishment of the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) in 1995 although a complete harmonization of the pharmaceutical market has not 
taken place. This was a significant step to speed approval times across Europe which had begun 
to suffer from increasing number of applications as the industry grew and technical and scientific 
issues became more complex. In addition, EU Directive 2004/27/EC introduced a uniform level 
of data protection for 10 years across the EU and precluded the launch of the generic copy until 
the expiry of the 10-year period.   
 
A centralized approval procedure, which grants a Community-wide authorization valid in all 
Member States, would increase efficiency by obviating the duplication of effort through a single 
market authorization process and saving  an annual expenditure of $350m by drug firms to get 
separate approvals from individual member countries (Annon 1994). The centralized procedure, 
however, does not apply to all products. It is mandatory for all biotechnology processes and 
optional for innovative chemical drugs provided the product offers a significant therapeutic, 
scientific or technical innovation15. 
 
After 1990, the pharmaceutical industry witnessed further harmonisation efforts. The Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994 strengthened 
intellectual property rights and provided significant financial incentives for companies by 
blocking generic competition until the expiry of the 20 years patent life and by extending the 
scope of patent protection both to products and processes  (WTO OMC 2003). Similarly, the 
International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) has aimed to achieve greater harmonisation in the 
application of technical guidelines and requirements for product registration across the EU, US 
and Japan to reduce or obviate the need of duplicative testing in the R&D stage16.  
 
Figure 4 shows that the median delays continued to decrease throughout 1995-2008 as a 
response to the harmonization efforts across the biggest 7 pharmaceutical markets, yet the 
differential delays have not been eliminated totally17. Most of the molecules launch immediately 
in the US followed by launch in the free-priced European markets of Germany and the UK 
within one year. The US emerges as the most favourable market because of high profit 
potentials. This is both because the US has the largest market size and a more liberal pricing 
environment compared to other OECD markets that employ some form of price control, either in 
the form of statutory pricing whereby the price is set on a regulatory basis or through price 
negotiations (Vogler 2008). Stringent price controls have been criticized for having negative 
                                                 
15 http://www.emea.europa.eu/  
16 http://www.ich.org 
17 Log-rank test for equality of survivor functions indicate that the difference in median delays between countries is 
significant (p-value: 0.0000). In addition, significant heterogeneity exists with respect to the ATC group (p-value: 
0.0021), which implies that the relative delays vary across ATC groups. 
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implications on the extent and timing of launch via knock-on effects on foreign markets through 
external referencing and parallel trade within the EU; however, the available evidence is limited 
(Danzon and Epstein 2005; Kyle 2007; Danzon and Epstein 2008).  
 
 
Figure 4. Survival Estimates: 1995-2008 
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The relative launch delays in Europe suggest an ordering with respect to price levels of 
pharmaceutical products. Figure 5 illustrates the correlation between median delays and the 
bilateral price indexes with respect to US prices for 200418. The correlation is -0.47 and is 
significant at the 0.01 level. France and Italy seem to have a comparable speed of launch with a 
median delay of around two years. The median lag in Spain has decreased compared to 1984-
1995 but it still lags about a year behind France and Italy. The lack of product patent protection 
for new pharmaceuticals before EU membership contributes to launch delays in Spain. EU 
accession in 1986 required Spain to comply with the European Patent Convention (EPC), which 
allowed the patentability of both products and processes. Spain enacted a new patent law in 1986 
which introduced patent protection for pharmaceuticals. However, effective patentability was 
delayed until 7 October 1992 through Reservation under Article 167 of the EPC, which 
essentially meant that pharmaceutical and chemical products could not be patented in Spain prior 
to 7 October 1992. In 1995, Spain ratified the TRIPS Agreement, which substantially changed 
 
18 Bilateral price indexes are calculated by considering common molecules in the US and the respective country, 
prices are weighted by the US Volume 
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the patent protection landscape19. In addition, Spain is one of the major parallel exporters in the 
EU due to its relatively lower drug prices, which are further pushed downwards by unilateral 
price cuts imposed on pharmaceutical prices. The delay in Spain, therefore, is consistent with 
pharmaceutical firm strategies to avoid parallel trade (Kyle 2007). 
 
 
Figure 5. Bilateral Price Indexes with Respect to US Prices vs. Median Delays 
(for ethical branded products in the retail sector) 
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Note: Bilateral price indexes are calculated by considering common molecules in 
the US and the respective country, prices are weighted by the US Volume20 
 
 
The Japanese drug lag extends to this period as well although the median Japanese delay 
decreases by two years with respect to the previous period. This is paradoxical given the 
international competitiveness of numerous Japanese high-tech industries including electronics 
and automobiles during 1990s. The Japanese pharmaceutical market is the second largest market 
in the world and offers a great profit potential because of a large market size and relatively high 
                                                 
19 
https://www.eversheds.com/uk/Home/Articles/index1.page?ArticleID=templatedata\Eversheds\articles\data\en\Heal
thcare\BioBrief_Stop_press_Direct_applicability_in_Spain_of_patent_provisions_of_the_TRIPS_Agreement 
20 ALIA: Australia; AUS: Austria; CAN: Canada; FIN: Finland; FRA: France; GER: Germany; GRE: Greece; ITA: 
Italy; JAP: Japan; NET: Netherlands; POL: Poland; POR: Portugal; TUR: Turkey; SAF: South Africa; SPA: Spain; 
SWE: Sweden; SWI: Switzerland 
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drug prices (see Figure 5). Nevertheless, the Japanese pharmaceutical industry still remains 
predominantly domestic and uncompetitive. 
 
Japanese regulations for new drug approval have required Japanese clinical data for evaluating 
the efficacy and safety of the drug even if foreign clinical data is available due to racial and 
ethnic variations in responses to medicines. In the past, all three phases of clinical trials had to be 
carried out on the Japanese population, which has driven launch delays in addition to other 
factors such as language barriers and longer times for patient enrolment in clinical trials. In 1998, 
Japan adopted the ICH E5 guideline entitled "Ethnic Factors in the Acceptability of Foreign 
Clinical Data" that recommends the use of foreign clinical data for new drug approval if there is 
one additional bridging study21 showing that the drug will behave similarly in the Japanese 
population. According to Uyama et al. (2005) new drug approvals based on a bridging strategy in 
Japan have increased from 3.2% in 1999 to 25% in 2003. Tabata and Albani (2008) report that 
companies are increasingly trying to leverage their operations globally in order to take advantage 
of the Japanese efforts to comply with the trend for globalising clinical trials (Tabata and Albani 
2008). These developments suggest that the drug lag in Japan can decrease over the next years 
(Uyama, Shibata et al. 2005). 
 
Ranking countries by median lags, countries may be characterised as leaders (the US, UK, 
Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Finland, Austria, Switzerland) and laggards (Belgium, Greece, 
South Africa, Poland, Portugal, and Turkey). The remaining countries (France, Canada, Italy, 
Australia, and Spain) rank as intermediaries with the rank dependant on the period and extent of 
global launch. The laggards and leaders, as defined by countries with median lags above and 
below the overall delays, are similar for the global and the US&UK molecules; however, the 
extent of the relative lag is shorter for the truly global molecules as is expected because global 
molecules have diffused to all markets and have non-censored survival times. Similarly, launch 
in all markets may indicate higher therapeutic or commercial importance at the product level.  
 
 
EMA Sub-Analysis 
Differences in the survival behaviour among the EU markets in Figure 4 indicate that 
pharmaceutical firms have adopted different launch strategies across markets in the EU and that 
efforts of harmonization in market authorization procedures have not eliminated the differentials 
in timing of launch across European countries. Sub-analysis for the EU countries22 is carried-out 
to further investigate the impact of the establishment of a centralized regulatory procedure in the 
                                                 
21 A bridging study aims to confirm that the efficacy, safety and dose-response relationships of the drug in the new 
population are similar to those in the population evaluated in the foreign studies 
22 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,  UK 
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EU. In order to compare relative delays for molecules that obtained centralized approval (central 
molecules) with those that did not (non-central molecules), data was collected for all centrally 
approved molecules from the EMA website (EMA publishes information following the grant of a 
Marketing Authorization as a European Public Assessment Report). This information was 
combined with the IMS database to estimate delays within the EU for molecules with a first 
global launch post-1995 (see Figure 623).  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Delays with respect to central vs. non-central approval in the EU 
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(Kaplan-Meier estimate for Spain not available, the restricted mean which 
provides a lower bound for the median is reported; EMEA: Molecules 
centrally approved by EMA) 
 
There is a statistically significant difference in launch behaviours between the central and non-
central molecules (p-value: 0.000 for the test of the null hypothesis that the survival behaviours 
of EMA and non-EMA molecules are identical). The effectiveness of a more streamlined 
authorization is demonstrated by the lower variation in launch timing for EMA molecules 
compared to molecules that did not go through the centralized procedure. The median delay for 
non-central molecules is greater by more than 2 years compared to the median delay of central 
molecules which is on the order of one year. The faster diffusion of centrally approved 
                                                 
23 Kaplan-Meier estimate for Spain not available, the restricted mean which provides a lower bound for the median 
is reported 
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molecules can be attributed to the elimination of differentials in regulatory approval times as 
well as a potentially higher therapeutic/commercial value of the centrally approved drugs.  
 
Central approval speeds up the introduction of molecules in laggard countries such as France, 
Italy and Spain. Spain exhibits the most dramatic reduction in median delays -a reduction from 5 
years to 1.5 years- among the five main European pharmaceutical markets due to central 
approval. For France and Italy the reduction is on the order of half a year only. The centralized 
EU procedure is compulsory for all medicinal products derived from biotechnology and other 
high technology processes. If the product does not belong to the designated disease categories24 
for central approval, companies can submit an application for a centralized marketing 
authorization, provided the product offers a significant therapeutic, scientific or technical 
innovation25. A more homogenous cross-country launch for central molecules across the EU 
indicates that on average European patients have more equitable access to drugs that have 
priority from a health policy perspective-at least to the extent that these drugs are diffused at 
comparable times (the take-up and access post-launch may introduce further differentials in 
access due to differences in reimbursement policies as well as cultural factors). 
 
3.2 Trends in the Adoption of Generic Products  
The lags in generic entry across countries depend on differentials in patent expiry dates or 
market exclusivity as well as originator firm strategies to block or delay generic competition. 
Due to unavailability of data to control for patent expiry dates or originator firm actions, the 
estimates provide generic lags as the time elapse between  the first global generic product launch 
and local generic launch for a given molecule-country pair. This measure therefore provides only 
a relative measure of differentials in the timing of generic availability across countries.  
 
Evolution of Median Delays over Decades 
The trend in overall median delays for generic molecules that launched both in the US&UK from 
1960 to 2008 is similar to the case in the cross-country diffusion of pharmaceutical innovation; 
the diffusion of imitative pharmaceutical has accelerated over time (see Figure 7). In each 
period, medians are reduced by half compared to the previous period. The overall median delay 
has decreased from 26 to 14.5 years from 1960-1984 to 1984-1995 and to 8 years during 1995-
2008.  
 
 
                                                 
24 These categories include all human medicines intended for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, cancer, diabetes, 
neurodegenerative diseases, auto-immune and other immune dysfunctions, and viral diseases, and all designated 
orphan medicines intended for the treatment of rare diseases 
25 http://www.emea.europa.eu/  
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 Figure 7. Overall median delays of generics with respect to period of global launch 
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In parallel to the case with innovative molecules, fixed and random effect Cox estimates for the 
impact of the period of first launch indicate that generics launched significantly faster after 1984. 
The Hausman test comparing fixed and random effects indicates that the shared frailty 
specification is correct (p-value 0.154). First launch during 1984-1995 is associated with a 2.5 
times faster hazard rate compared to first launch during 1960-1984, and first launch during 1995-
2008 is associated with a 6.5 times faster hazard rate compared to first launch during 1960-1984. 
The significance of the difference in the median delays across decades can also be inferred from 
the non-intersecting confidence intervals of medians estimated by Stata 10 (see Table A.2). The 
acceleration in generic adoption over time can be mainly attributed to new regulations in the US 
and EU that have enabled generic drug development before patent expiry and reduced capital 
requirements by obviating the need to reproduce data from clinical trials.  
 
 
3.2.1 1960-1984: Stringency in MA Regulations and the US drug lag  
In the previous sections, significant lags in the US were observed for innovative products (i.e. 
new molecules launching for the first time). As Figure 8 shows the US exhibits no lag with 
respect to the adoption of pharmaceutical imitation. Based on a cross-country perspective, Italy, 
Spain and France adopt generics latest, and are surpassed by Germany and the UK. This pattern 
in Europe is broadly in line with the case for innovative pharmaceutical diffusion; except for the 
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fact that UK lags behind Germany during this period by about 3 years (see Table A.3 for the 
exact figures). Also, generics reach Japan relatively fast during this period compared to the 
relative adoption speed of innovative molecules in Japan. 
 
Figure 8. Survival Estimates for Generics: 1960-1984 
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3.2.2 1984-1995: The Hatch-Waxman Act and Improved Generic Access in the US  
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 aimed to facilitate generic entry by eliminating the entry barrier 
of duplicative testing required for generic substitutes while ensuring adequate return for 
innovator firms through patent restoration (Wittner 2004). As the most immediate benefit, the 
1984 Act allowed generic manufacturers develop generic drugs before patent expiry of the 
originator product (often referred as the “Bolar” clause)26. Generic producers were allowed to 
reference the originator’s safety and efficacy data obviating the need to repeat the same tests, 
which reduced development costs substantially and therefore alleviated barriers to generic entry. 
The Act introduced 180 days of market exclusivity period to the first company to file a new 
generic application (known as ANDA, Abridged New Drug Application).  
 
 
 
 
26 The name is derived from a landmark case between Roche and the generic companies Bolar. Bolar won the right 
to start developing the generic copy of Roche’s patented compound Flurazepam Hydrochloride prior to its patent 
expiry, which was incorporated into the 1984 Act. 
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Figure 9. Survival Estimates for Generics: 1984-1995 
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Figure 9 shows that the pattern of differential lags during 1984-1995. Compared to the 1960-
1984 three main differences emerge. First, following the provisions for quicker generic entry in 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, the median delay in the US is reduced by 4 years (from 14 years to 
about 10 years). Second, the Japanese lag for generics increases by 4 years. Third, UK and 
Germany show equally fast generic adoption with a median lag on the order of 11-12 years. 
Finally, France, Italy and Spain follow with a median delay of 14-17 years.  
 
 
3.2.3 1995-2008: EMA and New Generic Legislations in Europe 
The period from 1995 to 2008 witnessed important regulatory changes in generic legislations 
both in the US and Europe. Europe followed the US in providing incentives for generic 
development and timely market access in Europe. The US, on the other hand, focused mainly on 
the prevention of originator firm strategies to delay or block generic competition.  
 
Changes in the US Generic Legislation  
Two revisions (McCain-Schumer legislation in 2002, Gregg-Schumer Act in 2003) to Hatch-
Waxman Act in the US sought to improve the balance between the needs of the branded 
companies and those of the generic companies. First, the new revisions set up a new mechanism 
to prevent the inclusion of frivolous patents or those filed at the last moment as a blocking 
mechanism. Second, the new legislation addressed the use of 180-day exclusivity period by 
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generic companies for special arrangements with originators as a means to prevent market entry 
of other generics27. Gregg-Schumer revisions included “forfeiture” provisions which put the 
generics company under risk of losing the exclusivity if found to have made such an 
arrangement.  
 
Changes in the European Generic Legislation  
Europe’s fragmented market structure has presented a major barrier to generic growth compared 
to the US market where federal law applies uniformly across different states. Directive 
2004/27/EC has aimed to remove some of these barriers by updating Directive 2001/83. As with 
the US Hatch-Waxman Act, the legislation was intended to balance the needs of the branded 
pharmaceutical companies and generics companies. Directive 2001/83, the overall body of EU 
law governing the manufacture and trade in pharmaceuticals, had flows such as the lack of a 
generic-product definition and allowed branded companies to withdraw reference products 
before generic entry.  
The new laws introduced a specific “generic” definition. One of the most important aspects for 
generics companies was the “Bolar” clause permitting generic companies to do their own 
development work within the EU during the period of patent protection for the original 
molecule. The practical impact of the clause on the timing of product launches may be minimal 
because wherever the development is carried out, generics cannot be launched prior to patent 
expiry. The main benefit however is that companies could maintain generic drug development in 
the EU28.  
Under the new legislation, the same product can be used as a reference product for generics 
everywhere in the EU even if not registered in particular countries. This is a small step towards 
unification of European generic legislation. An additional benefit of the new legislation is that if 
originator companies withdraw a brand before any generic versions are marketed, the generics 
can still use it as a reference product. Finally, the establishment of the EMA in 1995 had little 
direct impact on generics companies. However, the centralized procedure is open to generics 
provided that the original is approved through the centralized system (Wittner 2004) . 
 
 
Generic Lags across Markets follow the Pattern of Non-Generic Lags 
Figure 10 demonstrates that the pattern of launch for the first imitative generic product is quite 
                                                 
27 According to the 1984 Act, if the first generic company chose not to market the generic copy, all other generic 
competitors from the market would be excluded and all competition would be blocked for a period of 180 days. 
Authorized generics, copies made under license from the innovator companies, were introduced whereby the 
originator receives royalties on sales in return. For example, Par Pharma's generic version of Glaxo's Paxil 
(Paroxetine) was launched with Glaxo's approval even though Apotex had obtained six-month exclusivity for its 
own generic. 
28 As mentioned before, the SPC had prevented generic companies from engaging in R&D prior to patent expiry. 
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similar to the pattern for innovative molecules (Figure 4)29. New generic legislations have 
proven effective in the EU in further reducing the generic lag. The fastest adopters are as usual 
markets with relatively high originator prices (the US, UK and Germany) that offer higher profit 
prospects for imitative products. The median delay for the leaders is on the order of 4-5 years, 
with a reduction of 5-6 years compared to 1984-1995. More regulated markets (Italy, Spain and 
France) lag by about 5 years behind the leaders, with a median delay of 9-10 years (which is a 
significant reduction from 14-17 years in 1984-1995).  
 
Figure 10. Survival Estimates for Generics: 1995-2008 
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Japanese lag for the adoption of imitative products is not as dramatic as for innovative 
molecules; however, Japan is still the slowest market among the biggest seven markets with a 
median delay of 11 years. Generic drugs have been regarded in Japan as inferior. Similarly, 
physicians have had financial incentives for prescribing non-generic drugs. However, recently 
the government has initiated educational and advertising campaigns to improve generic use as 
well as changes on the provider side including elimination of the link between prescribing 
practices and physician salaries (Business Insights 2009).  
 
 
29 Similar to the non-generic case, equality by country, atc1, form1 and first launch period rejected (p-value < 0.001 
for all). 
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Similar survival profiles for new molecules and generic products indicate that the negative 
impact of price controls on the launch timing of pharmaceutical innovation translates to the 
adoption of imitative pharmaceutical products. The launch patterns show that regulated markets 
access innovation later but also face temporal disadvantage in terms of their access to cost-
saving generic products. To what extent this is balanced by lower branded prices remains an 
open question for further exploration. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has sought to provide an overview of the evolution of the drug lag for pharmaceutical 
innovation (new molecules) as well as generic copies across the main OECD markets with 
regards to changes in the regulatory environment during 1960-2008 using non parametric 
methods. This is the first study to provide a descriptive evolution of relative lags across a number 
of markets over a lengthy period of time and a comprehensive set of molecules, both for 
innovative products and generic copies. 
 
Lower transaction costs due to reductions in geographical barriers and lower regulatory costs 
(harmonized market authorization procedures, strengthened IP rights, patent term restorations) 
have exerted a downward pressure over time on median delays in individual countries as well as 
overall delays across the main OECD markets. All markets experience a decreasing trend over 
time for median delays following global launch. With the wider use of the centralized procedure 
over the coming years, the delays in the diffusion of pharmaceutical innovation across the EU 
may be further smoothed out. However, the relative lags across countries remain significant both 
for new molecules and generic products due to the variety in pricing and reimbursement 
regulations. In fact, an important finding is that the negative impact of price controls on new 
molecules translates to a later generic availability which suggests that regulation delays patient 
access to new pharmaceutical technologies but also creates opportunity costs for governments 
through foregone savings due to later generic availability compared to free markets. Assessing 
the impact on overall welfare, however, would require a comparison of savings from lower 
branded product prices and savings foregone due to late generic launch and possibly lower 
generic penetration. Relative delays in the diffusion of generics are expected to decrease further 
due to the impact of the new European legislation in 2004 and the push for genericization as a 
cost-containment mechanism in regulated markets that have been further challenged by the 
recent economic downturn.  
 
Globally, the relative lags exhibit a change in the geographical pattern of lags over time. The US 
lag back in 1960s has switched to more price stringent European markets throughout 1960-2008. 
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Relatively free-priced European markets of Germany and the UK30, which also have strong local 
pharmaceutical industries, lead in the EU as the fastest adopters of pharmaceutical innovation 
(and imitation). Product launch strategically takes place first in higher-priced EU markets as a 
result of threat of arbitrage and price dependency across the member states, which puts European 
markets with low prices and/or small market sizes such as Spain and Portugal at a disadvantage. 
Paradoxically, the Japanese market with its large market size and relatively high prices remains a 
laggard throughout 1960-2008. The idiosyncratic nature of clinical trial requirements in Japan 
has been the major driver of asymmetric costs for foreign pharmaceutical firms. Harmonization 
efforts on foreign clinical data use seem to be taking effect slowly and expected future rise in the 
use of the bridging strategy may further reduce the Japanese drug lag in the upcoming years. 
 
The R&D activity of leading pharmaceutical companies is largely carried out in the major OECD 
markets. Reducing delays in these markets will offer higher returns to R&D and stimulate further 
innovation contributing to dynamic efficiency over the long run.  On the other hand, new 
pharmaceutical technologies impose additional pressure on the tight health care budgets and 
quick diffusion of new technologies with uncertain benefits could lead to inefficiencies in the 
provision of health care (Garber and Skinner 2008). The introduction of new drugs in individual 
markets, therefore, should be balanced out with the expansion of drug expenditure and the 
evidence of cost-effectiveness. From a cross-country perspective, reducing the differential delays 
for globally important molecules will enable a more equitable access to new and possibly more 
effective treatment alternatives.  
 
Finally, the non-parametric approach adopted in this paper offered an exploratory analysis into 
the nature of the drug delay across countries and over time. The methodological approach can be 
extended in future research to analyze the impact of policy changes in 1984 and 1995 by a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis that treats policy changes as quasi-experiments. In 
addition, the impact of regulation on the international adoption speed of new molecules and 
generic competition can be further assessed in a (semi-) parametric survival analysis by 
treatment dummies for regulation or proxying the net effect of regulation with expected prices.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 However, prices may be indirectly affected through regulations in other parts of the market. In the UK profits are 
regulated through the PPRS (Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme) and products are subject to NICE appraisals 
for Cost-Effectiveness (“the fourth hurdle”). The Flexible Pricing scheme and Risk Sharing Agreements introduced 
in the 2009 PPRS will further emphasize value-for-money in NHS purchases of medicinal products. In Germany 
reimbursement regulation through reference pricing includes patented pharmaceuticals in reference groups unless 
novelty and therapeutic improvement is demonstrated and companies take this into consideration when setting 
prices. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A.1 Mean and Median Launch Lags over Time for  US & UK Molecules (Non-Generic) 
  1995-2008 1984-1995 1960-1984 
 Country Mean Std Error - 
Mean 
Median Std Error 
- Median
Mean Std Error -
Mean 
Median Std Error - 
Median 
Mean Std Error -
Mean 
Median Std Error -
Median 
Australia  3.598(*) 0.264 1.752 0.029 8.146(*) 0.58 4.838 0.118 18.143(*) 0.873 12.252 0.256 
Austria  2.181(*) 0.212 0.999 0.015 6.514(*) 0.559 3.42 0.077 19.254(*) 1.02 9.415 0.279 
Belgium  5.720(*) 0.359 2.667 0.058 9.137(*) 0.697 3.666 0.133 19.791(*) 1.065 8.501 0.446 
Canada  3.431(*) 0.281 1.336 0.032 7.402(*) 0.592 4 0.084 13.257(*) 0.81 6.084 0.124 
Finland  2.259(*) 0.208 0.999 0.014 7.397(*) 0.603 3.337 0.09 22.804(*) 1.07 13.999 0.573 
France  2.903(*) 0.233 1.585 0.022 6.482(*) 0.524 3.329 0.092 16.558(*) 0.942 6.585 0.224 
Germany  1.444 0.157 0.668 0.008 4.703(*) 0.473 2.001 0.042 11.576(*) 0.86 3.001 0.070 
Greece  4.138(*) 0.279 2.166 0.039 7.798(*) 0.565 4.58 0.095 22.250(*) 0.998 14.412 0.440 
Italy  2.927 0.212 1.749 0.015 6.227(*) 0.521 3.584 0.058 16.019(*) 0.964 6.253 0.133 
Japan  7.885(*) 0.338 6.582 0.194 12.441(*) 0.71 9.673 0.231 21.218(*) 1.034 11.414 0.304 
Netherlands 3.042(*) 0.319 0.75 0.02 5.726(*) 0.611 1.837 0.057 19.158(*) 1.105 7.247 0.317 
Poland  4.402(*) 0.264 3.001 0.049 9.395(*) 0.495 7.335 0.074 27.980(*) 0.666 26.497 0.204 
Portugal  8.521(*) 0.372 13.254 . 12.884(*) 0.711 8.83 0.272 25.436(*) 1.1 19.162 0.748 
S.Africa 5.590(*) 0.344 3.168 0.063 7.877(*) 0.611 4 0.122 21.776(*) 0.985 20.246 0.415 
Spain  6.318(*) 0.375 2.667 0.061 10.117(*) 0.667 5.84 0.142 19.309(*) 1.06 7.077 0.221 
Sweden  2.809(*) 0.286 0.747 0.016 8.311(*) 0.668 4.167 0.155 27.842(*) 1.086 27.83 . 
Switzerland 2.964(*) 0.261 1.413 0.027 5.842(*) 0.537 2.828 0.071 12.799(*) 0.931 4.085 0.143 
Turkey  5.701(*) 0.299 4 0.041 9.381(*) 0.552 6.834 0.095 25.803(*) 0.903 21.832 0.299 
UK  1.27 0.115 0.75 0.009 3.151 0.271 1.914 0.062 8.817 0.584 3.083 0.097 
 28
 29
US 0.665 0.102 0.001 . 3.602 0.277 2.664 0.055 10.052 0.469 7.666 0.120 
OVERALL 3.829(*) 0.067 1.667 0.038 7.636(*) 0.135 4.085 0.113 18.823(*) 0.219 10.587 0.326 
 
(* largest observed analysis time is censored, mean is underestimated) 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2 Median delays and confidence intervals by period of first launch  
(generic molecules) 
 
 Subjects median Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
1960-1984 3924 26.83 0.54 25.75 27.83 
1984-1995 1688 14.58 0.23 14.00 14.92 
1995-2008 869 7.83 0.31 7.33 8.58 
 
 
 
 
Table A.3 Mean and median launch delays for generic molecules that launched in US and UK 
 1995-2008 1984-1995 1960-1984 
Country Mean 
Std 
Error - 
Mean Median 
Std Error -
Median 
Mean 
Std 
Error - 
Mean Median 
Std Error -
Median 
Mean 
Std 
Error - 
Mean Median 
Std Error -
Median 
AUSTRALIA 7.425(*) 0.712 8.085 8.085 15.446(*) 0.831 16 0.073 27.460(*) 1.05 24.586 0.355 
AUSTRIA  7.877(*) 0.711 7.915 7.915 16.248(*) 0.808 14.001 0.146 31.961(*) 1.189 33.418 0.871 
BELGIUM  10.052(*) 0.674 . . 18.075(*) 0.721 17.084 . 33.843(*) 1.069 39.086 0.871 
CANADA  6.560(*) 0.632 6.916 6.916 12.981(*) 0.895 10.242 0.306 22.390(*) 1.063 17.333 0.226 
FINLAND  8.098(*) 0.72 7.417 7.417 16.553(*) 0.796 16 0.353 31.367(*) 1.279 31.496 . 
FRANCE  8.610(*) 0.661 8.914 8.914 15.912(*) 0.754 15.663 0.17 31.178(*) 1.092 29.752 0.463 
GERMANY  6.060(*) 0.6 5.081 5.081 12.768(*) 0.793 12.167 0.207 20.877(*) 1.18 15.168 0.136 
GREECE  9.261(*) 0.676 8.413 8.413 15.215(*) 0.93 15.253 0.38 30.055(*) 1.244 32.838 0.567 
ITALY  8.374(*) 0.69 9.339 9.339 16.817(*) 0.728 16.999 0.138 28.294(*) 1.422 27.083 0.801 
JAPAN  9.782(*) 0.646 11.496 11.496 18.784(*) 0.719 22.412 0.497 24.920(*) 1.443 18.412 0.532 
NETHERLA 7.451(*) 0.736 6.418 6.418 15.386(*) 0.965 13.413 0.265 32.053(*) 1.123 32.832 0.602 
POLAND  7.858(*) 0.703 7.168 7.168 13.114(*) 0.815 11.086 0.192 30.611(*) 0.901 29.495 0.278 
PORTUGAL  9.259(*) 0.645 11.496 11.496 15.922(*) 0.919 16 0.303 35.085(*) 1.151 . . 
SAFRICA 8.911(*) 0.606 8.832 8.832 16.261(*) 0.779 14.834 0.204 32.282(*) 1.228 31.247 0.385 
SPAIN  8.965(*) 0.633 9.747 9.747 16.110(*) 0.903 13.919 0.572 31.147(*) 1.294 34.749 0.846 
SWEDEN  8.119(*) 0.746 8.167 8.167 16.578(*) 0.823 15.001 0.267 36.388(*) 1.103 . . 
SWITZERLAND 10.530(*) 0.672 . . 17.173(*) 0.758 15.918 0.247 30.654(*) 1.222 29.248 0.893 
TURKEY  8.767(*) 0.808 9.832 9.832 15.293(*) 1.035 16.085 0.902 29.481(*) 1.198 28.413 0.529 
UK  4.486 0.388 4.252 4.252 10.596 0.507 11.25 0.182 18.619 0.772 18.168 0.147 
US 5.224 0.516 4.504 4.504 9.754 0.585 9.752 0.182 14.767 0.589 13.67 0.129 
Total 8.117(*) 0.16 7.833 7.833 15.314(*) 0.191 14.579 0.23 28.615(*) 0.27 26.831 0.544 
(* largest observed analysis time is censored, mean is underestimated)
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